

**POLIS
180**



Women, Peace and Security: A Chance for Georgia's and Ukraine's Protracted Conflicts?



A Report

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Preface

This report is published within the framework of the project “Women, Peace and Security: A Chance for Georgia’s and Ukraine’s Protracted Conflicts”, implemented by Polis180 (Berlin), IDP Women Association Consent (Tbilisi) and Ideas for Change (Kyiv). It is inspired by the discussions we had during two workshops and public events that took place in Kyiv (07-12 October 2018) and Tbilisi (25-30 November 2018). We would like to thank all our 24 workshop participants based in Germany, Georgia and Ukraine for the time and brainpower they devoted to our project. We are very grateful to those participants who wrote *Spotlights* for this report; these *Spotlights* are based on the participants’ individual experiences during the workshops and do not necessarily reflect the positions or experiences of other authors. We would also like to thank the speakers of the workshops and public events for their inspiring inputs.

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Federal Foreign Office



Acronyms

1325	UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security
CEDAW	UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women
EU	European Union
GID	Geneva International Discussions
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
LGBTIQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, Intersex, Queer Persons
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Approaching 20 Years of Women, Peace and Security

*“The women, peace and security agenda is a powerful tool for moving from exclusionary to democratic decision-making, from gender inequality to gender justice, from conflict and violence to sustaining peace, and to building prosperous and stable societies. We know that sexual and gender-based violence in conflict is widespread, and that women continue to be marginalized in peace and security processes. But there is mounting evidence that women’s participation in peace and security efforts contributes to more effective responses to today’s complex crises and that women play a critical but under-utilized role in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. That is why the women, peace and security agenda – with its focus on women’s participation, security and empowerment in global efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts – remains a vital tool to build more peaceful and inclusive societies”.*¹

In the year 2000, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted its landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) – UNSCR 1325. For the first time ever, the traditionally male- and hard security-dominated UN Security Council recognized the relationship between gender and security and acknowledged that women are actors, and not only victims, in conflicts, highlighting the different experiences of women and men during war. The history of the resolution, however, dates back much further. The UN has paid attention to women’s rights and equality since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, and established the Commission on the Status of Women already in 1946². In 1975 the UN hosted its first World Conference on Women, which gave a boost to the organization’s work on equality and women’s rights. Shortly after, in 1979 the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) – “the first global and comprehensive legally binding international treaty aimed at the elimination of all forms of sex- and gender-based discrimination against women”.³ Especially since the 1980s, scholars of feminist International Relations and NGO representatives have played a crucial role in developing and lobbying for the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.⁴ The fourth UN World Conference on Women that took place in Beijing in 1995, right after mass sexual violence on women in the conflicts in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia had become public,⁵ resulted in the Beijing ‘Platform for Action’ that included provisions on women and armed conflict. Certain UN agencies, such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) or the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA),

¹ Mlambo-Ngcuka, P. (2018, April 13). The women, peace and security agenda is a powerful tool. Remarks by Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka presented at the Launch Event of Finland’s 1325 National Action Plan in Finland, Helsinki. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from

² Aroussi, S. (2015). Women, Peace and Security. Repositioning Gender in Peace Agreements. Intersentia: Cambridge.

³ Simonovic, D. (2007). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Introduction.

Audiovisual Library of International Law. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cedaw/cedaw.html>

⁴ Barnes, K. (2011). The Evolution and Implementation of UNSCR 1325. An Overview. In: F. Olonisakin, K. Barnes & E. Ikpe (Eds.), Women, Peace and Security. Translating Policy Into Practice. (pp.15-33) Routledge: Milton Park

⁵ Aroussi, S. (2015). Women, Peace and Security. Repositioning Gender in Peace Agreements. (p.19)

began taking up aspects of WPS as well. Nevertheless, as Karen Barnes argues, “while these reports and declarations were all important in terms of advocacy and awareness raising, their impact on the mainstream of conflict and security issues at the UN was negligible”.⁶

Ultimately, though, at the Commission on the Status of Women session in 1998 a group of civil society organizations came together as the Women and Armed Conflict Caucus and started lobbying the Security Council for action on WPS. In 2000, the NGO Working Group on WPS was formed and started playing a crucial role in generating knowledge and awareness as well as ultimately pushing the UNSC towards the adoption of Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000. Without the efforts of civil society, academia and certain committed Member States, such as Namibia, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,⁷ Women, Peace and Security would possibly never have made it onto the agenda of the UN Security Council. Women’s groups hailed the adoption of UNSCR 1325 “as a watershed moment and a remarkable institutional achievement that had the potential to revolutionize established patriarchal ways of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding”.⁸ The recommendations of UNSCR 1325 are based on four main pillars.⁹

PARTICIPATION: Full and equal participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making, including peace-processes, electoral processes (both candidates and voters), UN positions, and the broader social-political sphere
CONFLICT PREVENTION: Incorporation of a gender perspective and the participation of women in preventing the emergence, spread, and re-emergence of violent conflict as well as addressing root causes including the need for disarmament. Address the continuum of violence and to adopt a holistic perspective of peace based on equality, human rights and human security for all, including the most marginalized, applied both domestically and internationally
PROTECTION: Specific protection rights and needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict settings, including reporting and prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence; domestic implementation of regional and international laws and conventions
RELIEF AND RECOVERY: Access to health services and trauma counseling, including for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence

During the years that followed, the UN Security Council adopted several follow-up resolutions: UNSCR 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015). All of them further develop the course of action to be taken in order to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. For instance, UNSCR 1820 recognizes sexual violence as a weapon and tactic of war; UNSCR 1889 calls for the

⁶ Barnes, K. (2011). The Evolution and Implementation of UNSCR 1325. (p.18)

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ Aroussi, S. (2015). Women, Peace and Security. Repositioning Gender in Peace Agreements. (p.28)

⁹ Adapted from: Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (2013). Women, Peace and Security. National Action Plan Development Toolkit. (p.5) Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/national_action_plan_development_toolkit.pdf

development of indicators to measure the implementation of UNSCR 1325; UNSCR 1969 sets up a “naming and shaming” mechanism for sexual violence in conflicts; UNSCR 2122 links disarmament and gender equality; UNSCR 2242 emphasizes the need for increased funding for gender-responsive training, analysis and programs.¹⁰ In 2016, the UN Security Council created the *Informal Expert Group* on WPS with the goal of “strengthen[ing] more systematically the oversight and coordination of Women, Peace and Security implementation work”.¹¹ Moreover, the WPS Focal Points Network was established, which supports the coordination of WPS implementation among Member States.

Scholars and practitioners are still debating whether UNSCR 1325 can be considered legally binding.¹² Either way, there is no legal mechanism to hold states and international organizations accountable¹³ – which, arguably, does not bode well for WPS implementation. The Agenda had a slow start even within the UN system: For instance, according to Hall-Martin (2011) the United Nations Mission in Kosovo “has failed by and large to seriously address gender mainstreaming through the structures outlined in UNSCR 1325”.¹⁴ According to UN Women, up until now, “women are not consistently included and engaged in negotiating peace – they are consistently excluded”.¹⁵ So far, 79 UN Member States (40 percent) and 11 regional actors, such as the European Union and the African Union, have adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) that outline the strategies and measures to be taken for the implementation of the WPS Agenda on the national level.¹⁶ 57 out of those 79 NAPs detail mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation and only 34 NAPs include allocated budgets. Many Western states have adopted NAPs that focus solely on actions to be taken in other countries¹⁷ – which indicates a lack of understanding that the WPS agenda is relevant for all, including those without armed conflict on their territory. Overall, many NAPs are underfunded, developed without much consultation with civil society and lack indicators that are precise enough to hold governments accountable.¹⁸

¹⁰ Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (n.d.). The Resolutions. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://www.peacewomen.org/why-WPS/solutions/resolutions>

¹¹ Women's International League of Peace and Freedom (n.d.). United Nations Obligations on Women, Peace and Security. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.peacewomen.org/UN/WPS-obligations>

¹² Aroussi, S. (2015). Women, Peace and Security. Repositioning Gender in Peace Agreements. (p.30)

¹³ Saferworld (2013). Reinvigorating UNSCR 1325: Building a More Committed Approach to Gender, Peace and Security. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/103-reinvigorating-uns-cr-1325--building-a-more-committed-approach-to-gender-peace-and-security>

¹⁴ Hall-Martin, C. H. (2011). Gendered Violence and UNSCR 1325 in Kosovo. Shifting Paradigms on Women, Peace and Security. In: F. Olonisakin, K. Barnes & E. Ikpe (Eds.), Women, Peace and Security. Translating Policy Into Practice. (pp.37-51) Routledge: Milton Park

¹⁵ UN Women (2018). Women's Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and the Implementation of Peace Agreements. Retrieved 14 December, 2018 <http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2018/egm-womens-meaningful-participation-in-negotiating-peace-en.pdf?la=en&vs=3047>. (p.3)

¹⁶ PeaceWomen (2018). Member states. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states>

¹⁷ Antonakis, A. & Popovic, N. (2018). Ein guter Plan in unsicheren Zeiten - 1325 Aktionspläne im Vergleich. Mauerpark Institut: Berlin. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://mauerparkinstitute.org/2018/04/22/ein-guter-plan-in-unsicheren-zeiten-1325-aktionsplane-im-vergleich/>


¹⁸ Barnes, K. (2011). The Evolution and Implementation of UNSCR 1325. (p.25)

Spotlight | Measuring the Implementation of UNSCR 1325: The UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security 2011-2020

Miriam Mona Müller

To realize the full potential of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, measurement tools are key. Precise indicators can point out limitations as well as achievements in the implementation of the Agenda 1325, and thereby help to improve UN-wide coordination. The UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security 2011-2020¹⁹ is precisely such a measurement tool that makes policy planning, monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the WPS Agenda on the UN level more effective. On the one hand, the Framework thus offers a common guideline for all involved actors. On the other hand, it can serve to hold all Member States accountable for realizing UNSCR 1325 and its follow-up resolutions.

The UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security is based on the four pillars of the 1325 UN Security Council Resolution: Prevention, Participation, Protection, Relief and Recovery and their respective goals. All goals are divided into targets for 2014 and for 2020.



Example: UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security
Goal 2, outcome 2.2., output 2.2.3., target by 2020

Moreover, each goal is linked to indicators which illustrate the desired outcomes and output. For instance, for Goal 2, *equal participation*, the outcome 2.2 is “increased attention to women’s priorities and gender issues in peace agreements”. For that

¹⁹ United Nations (2011). UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/Strategic_Framework_2011-2020.pdf

purpose, the UN Framework designs three outputs out of which output 2.2.3 is formalized as: “Women’s representatives engage in consultations with mediation and negotiating teams during peace processes”. The target for 2020 is that “85 percent of all United Nations special envoys and mediators and mediation teams undertake regular consultations with women leaders and women’s civil society organizations”.

Formulating indicators, outcomes and outputs can enable the effective realization of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in various institutions, not only within the UN. However, 18 years after UNSCR 1325 was adopted, results are mixed. For the time being, there is a strong commitment of national civil society as well as of Member States’ working groups, e.g. the WPS National Focal Point Network. But now is the time for UN Member State governments to show meaningful commitment as well. There is no need to reinvent the wheel: The UN Strategic Results Framework can serve as a powerful tool for the UN Security Council to monitor the implementation of resolution 1325. For instance, the Framework can help to evaluate achievements by UN Member States and to point out WPS champions among them. Member States that are less engaged in 1325 thus far and, for example, have not allocated adequate financial resources or distributed clear institutional responsibilities in the respective National Action Plans will be encouraged to replicate the experience of WPS champions. Therefore, making good use of measurement tools such as the UN Strategic Results Framework is key for ensuring global progress on Women, Peace and Security.

Evidently, despite the increasing attention paid to gendered perspectives in the UN Security Council²⁰, much remains to be done. Almost 20 years after its adoption, UNSCR 1325 hasn’t lost any of its urgency and remains the most important mechanism to push for women’s participation and protection in peace and security and for gendered perspectives on conflict prevention, transformation and recovery. While this report is far from exhaustive, it sheds light on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Ukraine and Georgia and considers ways to enhance 1325 on the road to its 20th anniversary.

²⁰ Wallström, M. (2018, January 2). Opinion Piece: Sweden has strengthened the voice of women in the United Nations Security Council. Published in Dagens Nyheter. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.government.se/opinion-pieces/2018/01/sweden-has-strengthened-the-voice-of-women-in-the-united-nations-security-council/>

Women, Peace and Security: A Chance for Georgia's and Ukraine's Protracted Conflicts?


Having explained the genesis of the UN Agenda on Women, Peace and Security, this chapter sheds light on the implementation of the agenda in Ukraine and Georgia. Like other parts of this report, it includes *Spotlights* written by and reflecting the perspectives of the #womenps participants.

Spotlight | Understanding Peace Beyond the Security Paradigm

Benedikt Hielscher

A common understanding of the term peace is based on its relationship to the state of war or armed conflict. This holds true both for cross-border and internal hostilities (i.e. civil war). This understanding is limiting as it only allows for the existence of two states, one being war and the other peace, without being able to measure the *quality* of either of the two. It is clear that the situations in Ukraine, Georgia and Germany are quite different. If asked to attach the label of either *war* or *peace* to the three countries, one might say that Germany is in a state of peace and Ukraine in a state of war. However, these broad labels would certainly not do justice to all aspects of life in either country. Is Georgia at peace or at war? Even when understood as a range between two extreme points, with peace being on one end and armed conflict on the other, peace would still merely be perceived as the opposite of war.

The Norwegian mathematician Johan Galtung proposed a different conceptualization, that of positive and negative peace²¹, two states on different ends of a spectrum. According to this model, negative peace describes a state of absence of direct violence,




and positive peace a state of absence of both structural and cultural violence. Galtung proposed to analyze violence on three different dimensions: direct, cultural and structural.²² Simply put, direct violence encompasses the elements of violence that we can commonly see and think of when speaking of violence: physical violence (e.g. punching, stabbing, shooting), verbal violence (e.g. insulting, bullying), psychological violence (e.g.

²¹ Galtung, J. (1964). An Editorial. *Journal of Peace Research*, 1(1), (p.1-4).

²² Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

emotional abuse). Structural and cultural violence exist on a more abstract level, but their effects translate directly into human rights violations. Structural factors, for instance, are the laws and policies that prevent victims of direct violence from seeking justice or protection, such as laws that prevent prosecution of acts of sexualized violence during marriage. Structural and cultural violence thereby enable direct violence; they are deeply ingrained into our societies and thus hard to transform. Cultural violence comprises ideas and norms manifested in thinking patterns, media publications, language, education, etc. that justify violent behavior, e.g. racism and white supremacy, victim blaming, and rape culture.

War has devastating effects on societies even after armed violence is ended through a peace agreement. Today's wars are more internationalized, more complex thus harder to solve,²³ requiring new thinking with regard to rebuilding societies after war. Negotiations and peacemaking processes have to focus not only on the immediate cessation of hostilities but also on the contents of a political settlement implemented at a later stage. Madhav and Wallensteen (2018)²⁴ have developed the Quality Peace Framework, emphasizing five dimensions as crucial for a durable, high quality peace (i.e. high peace agreement implementation) after internal war: both real and perceived human security have to be high so that groups within the population feel safe to express their differences non-violently; the economy has to be transformed from a war economy into



a peace economy that allows individuals to sustain a livelihood; possibilities for civil society to operate without fear of repercussion; the provision of transparent and accountable governance accessible to all members of society; and the implementation of a locally accepted transitional justice mechanism contributing to overall reconciliation.

Women, Peace and Security in Ukraine

The Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the ensuing war in Eastern Ukraine made the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda a more urgent matter in Ukraine. In February 2016, the Ukrainian government launched its first *National Action Plan (NAP) on Implementation of UNSCR 1325* for the period until 2020.²⁵ The Ukrainian NAP reflects the countries' challenges posed by armed conflict in the Donbas.

²³ Dupuy, K., Gates, S., Nygård, H. M., Rudolfson, I., Rustad, S. A., Strand, H., & Urdal, H. (2017). Trends in armed conflict, 1946–2016. *Conflict Trends*, 2, (p.1-4).

²⁴ Madhav, J., & Wallensteen, P. (eds.) (2018). *Understanding Quality Peace: Peacebuilding After Civil War*. Routledge.

²⁵ Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016). *National Action Plan on Implementation of UNSCR 1325*. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine_NAP.pdf

With more than 10.000 people killed, more than 24.000 injured and 1.6 million people internally displaced, the country is still experiencing violence, insecurity and instability on a daily basis.²⁶ The NAP proposes to conduct studies in order to assess the impact of the conflict on the national human rights protection system with a focus on gender-based violence and women's participation in peacebuilding. It also suggests a needs assessment for infrastructure and social services, specialist trainings, awareness-raising for the prevention and combating of gender-based violence and assistance to people affected by the conflict. The NAP also acknowledges the lack of criminal investigation and prosecution of sexual offenders and sets out to improve reporting mechanisms for sexual violence. In addition, the NAP aims to increase women's participation in peacebuilding, peace negotiations and monitoring missions, with a goal of 30 percent women's share until 2020. Ukraine is also one of the few countries that have NAPs with publicly accessible budgets and allocate funds to specific activities²⁷, which makes the implementation process more transparent.

Evidently, the Ukrainian government has the ambition to implement the NAP: For example, the State Border Guard Service developed its own action plan, introduced the post of Gender Equality Officer, and integrated a gender component into all training areas of the Border Guard Academy. The Ministry of Justice implements the NAP with further training for judges and prosecutors on domestic violence and trafficking. In summer 2017, the police network against domestic violence launched a pilot project with mobile support teams specially trained for victim support. In September 2018, police forces were given enhanced powers to prevent domestic violence offenders from entering or contacting their victims' homes.²⁸

Nevertheless, women's participation in the peace process remains low.²⁹ Women's rights organizations see the cause of this in low financial and social security giving women no room to contribute politically.³⁰ Moreover, the conflict and the resulting social, economic and political crisis in Ukraine have created new challenges for the protection of women's rights. On both sides of the contact line, human rights violations, including gender-based and sexual violence, have been reported, committed by the national army as well as by combatants from the side of certain districts of the Donetsk

²⁶ Council on Foreign Relations (2018). Global Conflict Tracker. Conflict in Ukraine. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker?marker=26#!/conflict/conflict-in-ukraine>

²⁷ Antonakis, A. & Popovic, N. (2018). Ein guter Plan in unsicheren Zeiten - 1325 Aktionspläne im Vergleich. Mauerpark Institut: Berlin. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://mauerparkinstitute.org/2018/04/22/ein-guter-plan-in-unsicheren-zeiten-1325-aktionsplane-im-vergleich/>

²⁸ UNIAN (2018). Ukrainian Police Authorized to Deal with Domestic Violence. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.unian.info/society/10257897-ukrainian-police-authorized-to-deal-with-domestic-violence.html>

²⁹ Gast, A.-S. (2016). The Pivotal Role of Women in Ukraine's Peacebuilding Process. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://polis180.org/polisblog/2016/12/08/women-ukraine-peacebuilding>

³⁰ Alternative Youth Centre, Centre for Social and Labour Research, Centre of the Future, Child Smile, East Donbas Regional Development Agency, Gender Dnipro, Theatre for Dialogue, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (2017). Universal Periodic Review. Joint Submission to the UPR Working Group 28th Session. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UKRAINE.UPR_JointSubmission-30-Mar-2017.pdf

and Luhansk Oblasts - against members of the opposing conflict party and civilians.³¹ Conflict-related sexual violence included rape, damage to pregnant women's womb, sexual harassment and sexual violence against men during torture.

Ukrainian national legislation has no definition of gender-based violence and a lack of financial, material and professional resources further hinder effective prevention and response to gender-based violence.³² At least 22 percent of women aged 15-49 have experienced at least one form of physical or sexual violence, with 90 percent of perpetrators being men.³³ Women who face multiple discrimination, such as women with disabilities or women living with HIV, ethnic minority, LGBTIQ or IDP women, are more vulnerable to all forms of gender-based violence and less likely to report to the police and other institutions.³⁴ Cases of domestic violence have increased in connection with the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine - in 2015 alone, reported cases increased by 50 percent.³⁵ Traumatic experiences among civilians, combatants and returnees, which often remain un- or inadequately treated, the lack of help facilities and increased alcohol consumption contribute to the rise in violence. The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the Istanbul Convention, was signed by Ukraine in 2011 but has not been ratified yet because of disputes over the terms *gender* and *sexual orientation*, which are rejected by conservative groups.³⁶ In the UN Universal Periodic Review 2017, various countries urged Ukraine to ratify the Istanbul convention and to criminalize domestic violence. Other submissions called for strengthening domestic legislation against human trafficking, allocating more financial resources to help IDPs and ensuring the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.³⁷ Since then, the law on domestic violence has been revised,³⁸ but the Istanbul convention is still not ratified.

³¹ Eastern-Ukrainian Centre for Civic Initiatives (2017). War without Rules. Gender-Based Violence in the Context of the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://jfp.org.ua/system/reports/files/110/en/gon_eng_220818_web.pdf

³² *ibid.*, (p.112)

³³ UNDP Ukraine (2017). Ukrainians Mobilize To Stop Violence Against Women. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://undpukraine.exposure.co.ukrainians-mobilize-to-stop-violence-against-women>

³⁴ United Nations Secretary-General's Campaign UNiTE, United Nations Ukraine (2018). 16 Days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence in Ukraine. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://ukraine.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/2018-11-20%20UNFPA%20Factsheet%20eng2.pdf>

³⁵ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2015). Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine. 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/9thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>

³⁶ Ukraine Crisis Media Center (2017). Why Ratification of the Istanbul Convention, a Tool to Prevent Domestic Violence, Is Blocked?. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://uacrisis.org/53548-nasylstvo>

³⁷ UPR Info (2018). Responses to Recommendations. Ukraine, Third Review, Session 28. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/ukraine/session_28_-_november_2017/responses_to_recommendations_upr28_ukraine.pdf

³⁸ Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2017). Про внесення змін до Кримінального та Кримінального процесуального кодексів України з метою реалізації положень Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з цими явищами. (On Amendments of the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine in Order to Implement the Provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence.) Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2227-19>

Spotlight | Prioritizing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Ukraine

Anastasiia Tokunova

As a country at war, Ukraine has an urgent need to increase the meaningful participation of women in the field of peace and security. Nevertheless, women and women's issues remain excluded from the sphere of peace and security, which is a direct reflection of the societal challenges to gender equality in general, and in decision-making in particular. These challenges include, firstly, patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes towards women that have prevailed in all spheres of life, from everyday routines to governance and policy levels. Secondly, awareness about gender equality is rather low among the wider population, in the authorities, law enforcement, military bodies, and even among civil society activists, except those directly working in related spheres. Thirdly, key policy and strategic documents related to ensuring equal opportunities for women and men, including those in the sphere of peace and security, remain largely declarative, under-budgeted and too slowly introduced into the all levels of governance, especially the local. Fourthly, knowledge about and spirit of collaboration on peace and security matters are not high for both groups: 1) women and women's organizations and 2) the authorities, law enforcement and military bodies.

It's fair to note that Ukraine has made significant steps towards implementing UNSCR 1325 on the national level through the development and adoption of the National Action Plan in February 2016 with further adjustments in September 2018. However, the Women, Peace, Security Agenda remains secondary in the state programming and hierarchy of policy planning. The key national strategic documents keep silent about the necessity of comprehensive implementation of the Agenda 1325. For instance, the "Strategy for Sustainable Development 'Ukraine - 2020'"³⁹ demonstrates a lack of attention not only to UNSCR 1325, but to gender equality issues in general, while broader human rights issues found certain attention in connection with planned reforms in the justice and law enforcement sectors. The strategic vision, goal and objectives of the "Strategy for Regional Development until 2020"⁴⁰ demonstrate nearly the same approach; moreover, even less attention is paid to human rights issues. Turning to the "National Strategy in the Field of Human Rights",⁴¹ it is possible to find the inclusion of certain priorities of the UNSC Resolution 1325, but, again, the document does not comprehensively take into account the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

³⁹ President of Ukraine (2015). Указ. Про Стратегію сталого розвитку "Україна - 2020". (Decree. About the Strategy for Sustainable Development "Ukraine 2020".) Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5/2015>

⁴⁰ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2014). Постанова. Про затвердження Державної стратегії регіонального розвитку на період до 2020 року. (Decree. On Approval of the State Strategy for Regional Development for the period until 2020.) Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/385-2014-%D0%BF>

⁴¹ President of Ukraine (2015). Указ. Про затвердження Національної стратегії у сфері прав людини. (Decree. On Approval of the National Human Rights Strategy.) Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/501/2015#n152>

And, finally, the overall goal and strategic components' formulation of the "Targeted State Program for Recovery and Peacebuilding in the Eastern Regions of Ukraine"⁴² doesn't directly mention UNSCR 1325, although on the level of tasks it is possible to identify some relevant activities, for instance with regard to the prevention of gender-based violence, women's empowerment and participation.

On the regional level, for instance in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, where the conflict is still ongoing, the situation is quite similar. The programmatic content of the "Donetsk Region Development Strategy until 2020"⁴³ neither touches upon the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, nor upon gender equality issues more generally. However, on the level of tasks, certain gender issues are taken into account, e.g. women's economic empowerment. The same applies to the "Luhansk Region Development Strategy for the Period until 2020".⁴⁴ Ultimately, the lack of emphasis on UNSCR 1325 in the reviewed official documents and strategies results in a lack of budget allocation for the purpose of a comprehensive and consistent implementation process.

In light of these challenges and the ongoing conflict, the question of how to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Ukraine is pertinent. To that end, I propose three ideas: *First*, to organize an awareness raising campaign in Ukraine that encompasses the following elements: a) the promotion of positive examples of women's participation in negotiation processes and conflict resolution and b) a compilation of international commitments and recommendations on enhancing the participation of women in peace and security. The target audience for this campaign should be 1) the government, law enforcement and military officials, 2) civil society and especially women's organizations, 3) the public.

Second, to implement a complex capacity building program with regard to Women, Peace and Security in Ukraine, focusing on the provision of knowledge and skills to women and NGOs about participation in peacebuilding and transitional justice processes and recovery initiatives and strengthening the capacities of the authorities for cooperating with civil society and women's organizations. *Third*, civil society organizations advocating for 1325 should join forces, and this should include not only women's organizations. If a large network of different societal actors manages to speak with one voice, the Agenda 1325 will receive much bigger attention from policy makers.

⁴² Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2017). Постанова. Про затвердження Державної цільової програми відновлення та розбудови миру в східних регіонах України. (On Approval of the State Target Program for the Restoration and Peace Building of the Eastern Regions of Ukraine.) Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1071-2017-%D0%BF>

⁴³ Donetsk Regional State Administration (2016). Donetsk Region Development Strategy until 2020. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://dn.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/DO-2016_eng-final-print.pdf

⁴⁴ Luhansk Regional State Administration (2016). Luhansk Region Development Strategy for the Period until 2020. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://www.ua.undp.org/content/dam/ukraine/docs/Donbas/RPP/Luhansk-reg-dev-strategy_ENG-14-06-2017.pdf

Finally, the Government of Ukraine should apply a more strategic approach to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, rather than engaging in mere activities-based planning. Effective and efficient implementation is impossible without well-structured and systematic identification of appropriate priorities from the top to the local level of state development planning and programming. UNSCR 1325 should be pointed out clearly as an important human rights instrument for Ukraine, especially in the context of the ongoing conflict, and this should be reflected in the respective umbrella strategies in the field of human rights. Moreover, it is important to work on introducing the UNSC resolutions on Women, Peace and Security into the policy and strategic documents on the local level of governance, based on the nationally adopted action plans and legislation.

Women, Peace and Security in Georgia

Georgia has been shaken by severe armed conflict several times since the early 1990s – it saw wars with the breakaway regions South Ossetia (1991-1992) and Abkhazia (1992-1993), a civil war in 1991-1993 and a war with Russia (2008) – and is still gravely affected by the consequences. These conflicts led to massive internal displacement, mainly of ethnic Georgians who fled Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The last wave of displacement was caused by the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. In October 2018, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 280.000 IDPs, which constitutes approximately 7 percent of the total population.⁴⁵ As in other post-conflict situations, women and men are affected differently, with 55 percent of the internally displaced being women.

Spotlight | On Abkhazia, Memory and Knowledge

Tamar Kapanadze

I was born during the Georgian-Abkhaz war. I have never seen this part of Georgia with my own eyes. But I've heard the elderly telling stories about the legendary beauty of Sokhumi, the glistening sea and how peacefully they were living alongside Abkhazians. A big part of my generation does not have an emotional connection to Abkhazia like the elderly have it. We also lack knowledge. No in-depth and objective education about the war is provided in school or university. Most of our population does not have information about what really happened, about the mistakes of each party to the conflict, or what Abkhazians are angry about. However, in order to engage in meaningful

⁴⁵ Javakhadze, N. (2018). Statement by Ms. Nino Javakhadze, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, 69th session of the UNHCR ExCom, 01.10.2018. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.unhcr.org/excom/speeches/5bb264194/statement-of-georgia.html>

conflict resolution, we need reliable information about what really happened. Admitting our mistakes, analyzing the influence of external actors on the conflict and outlining beneficial outcomes for both parties may affect the conflict positively.

The lack of knowledge about and the lack of an emotional connection to Abkhazia means that the memories of my generation are not free from, but less occupied by murders and other horrors of war. At the same time, this lack of knowledge and personal experience contributes to a situation in which the young generation pushes for the territorial integrity of Georgia without thinking about the wants and needs of Abkhazians.

This is related to a second issue: Many people do not recognize the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, and portray it merely as a conflict between Georgia and Russia. Certainly, the conflict would look different without Russia's involvement. However, more than 25 years after the Georgian-Abkhaz war, a departure of Russian forces from Abkhazia would not necessarily imply a resolution of the conflict. I remember when Georgians started the "mushamba campaign", which means hello in Abkhazian, on Facebook, and Abkhazians responded with a "goodbye campaign". Therefore, in order to ultimately solve the conflict, my generation has to try to understand and manage it better.

Since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, women's organizations in Georgia, including IDP women groups, have been using it as a tool to advocate for women's protection and participation. In 2004, the Gender Equality Council and the Advisory Council on Gender Equality at the Chairman of the Parliament were created, with civil society engagement in both structures. In 2006, the State Concept on Gender Equality⁴⁶ and the Law on Elimination of Domestic Violence, Protection and Support of Victims of Domestic Violence⁴⁷ were introduced, and the former made direct references to UNSCR 1325.

The 2008 war and its consequences, such as increasing numbers of displaced persons, led to even more active pushing for the implementation of 1325 on the part of women's organization and UN Women, which resulted in the elaboration and adoption of the first Georgian NAP for the period of 2012 to 2015. Georgia thereby became the first country in the region to adopt a National Action Plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Since then, two more NAPs were passed. The second NAP, for the period 2016-2017, was monitored by the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia, Women's Information

⁴⁶ The Parliament of Georgia (2006). The State Concept on Gender Equality. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://www.parliament.ge/files/98_12977_250758_concept_gender_E.doc

⁴⁷ The President of Georgia (2006). Law of Georgia. On Elimination of Domestic Violence, Protection, and Support of Victims of Domestic Violence. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/26422/2/en/pdf>

Center and IDP Women’s Association “Consent”. The results were considered for the preparation of the third NAP (2018-2020).

The monitoring results⁴⁸ for the second NAP indicated that the intended measures were not fully implemented and did not generate the desired improvements to human rights and social conditions for the conflict-affected population, especially for women and girls. Moreover, according to the report, the special needs of marginalized groups have not been sufficiently considered. Conflict-affected women and girls did not receive appropriate psychosocial rehabilitation and reproductive health-care services. Awareness-raising activities about domestic violence and violence against women were insufficient, reporting of incidents against women in the conflict regions and IDP women remained low and media reporting did not cover the needs of conflict-affected women and girls. None of the implemented activities focused on women and girls living in the breakaway regions. State support for the empowerment of conflict-affected women and girls remained low. Moreover, the report asserted that training programs conducted to increase gender sensitivity among the staff of state institutions remained largely insufficient, with some ministries not conducting *any* trainings. The monitoring report also included a set of recommendations based on consultations with grassroots initiatives. These comprise the localization of the NAP through the involvement of conflict-affected women and girls in decision-making and policy-planning processes at the local level, as well as the improvement of communication and cooperation among regional NGOs, local administrative bodies and the central Government.

The third NAP for the period 2018-2020 takes these findings into account. The NAP is coordinated by the Inter-Agency Commission on Gender Equality, Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which includes deputy ministers and gender focal points from responsible ministries, as well as the Thematic Consultative Working Group with representatives from civil society, municipalities and international organizations. The third NAP strengthens opportunities for local women’s and NGO involvement at all stages, including development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.

The action plan for 2018-2020 continues to focus on the conflict-affected territories and IDPs, as well as to mainstream Women, Peace and Security into Georgia’s international peacekeeping and diplomatic activities. However, gaps remain: Just as in the previous version, the updated NAP does not include a specific allocated budget or a reference to its funding. The current approach is to include financing in the budget of affected municipalities, although there have been efforts to include it into the national budget as well. Clearly, the allocation of sufficient funding will be crucial for the successful implementation of the third NAP.

⁴⁸ Public Defender of Georgia (2017). Implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in Georgia. Monitoring Results 2017.

Spotlight | Gender, Peace and Security: Traumatic Masculinities in Georgia

Sonja Schiffers

UN Security Council Resolution 1325⁴⁹ refers to *gender* in multiple ways, including in its declaration of “willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations”; its urging of “Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts”; and its calling on “all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective“. Nevertheless, scholars and activists have repeatedly criticized the lack of a broader understanding of gender in the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Measures taken to implement the Agenda 1325 largely focus on women – given the continuing discrimination against women and relative absence of their voices and concerns, this seems more than legitimate at first sight.

At a closer look, however, it becomes evident that considering Women, Peace and Security more broadly is crucial: as *Gender, Peace and Security*. Adopting a Gender, Peace and Security approach would evade the perception that *women are different* and thus need special treatment. It would imply a halt to considering male experiences as the “norm”, and result in much better understandings of the relationship between gender and conflicts. A genuine *gender* perspective would therefore include working with men as well: How are men’s experiences shaped by socially constructed ideas of masculinities, i.e. “cluster[s] of norms, values, and behavioral patterns expressing explicit and implicit expectations of how men should act and represent themselves to others”?⁵⁰ What is the relationship between masculinities, military power and war?

An important contribution to the study of masculinities and conflict was made by Peter Kabachnik et al. in their article “Traumatic Masculinities: the Gendered Geographies of Georgian IDPs⁵¹ from Abkhazia”.⁵² Therein, the authors examine the identity construction of men displaced from Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war as well as the impact of displacement on gendered power structures in families. Unsurprisingly, many IDPs from Abkhazia experienced material, physical and emotional trauma due to displacement and the resulting loss of their homes, about which many are reminded daily by their poor living conditions. Beyond that, as the authors argue, “many Georgian IDP men from Abkhazia continue to experience trauma [...] as a result of altered gender roles, demasculinization, and loss of their privileged status”. During displacement, many men

⁴⁹ UNSC (2000). Resolution 1325. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325\(2000\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325(2000))

⁵⁰ Miescher, S., Lindsay, L. (2003). Introduction: Men and Masculinities in Modern African History. In: Miescher, S., Lindsay, L. (Eds.) Men and Masculinities in Modern Africa. Quoted from Kabachnik et al. (2013). (see below)

⁵¹ IDP = internally displaced person

⁵² Kabachnik, P., Grabowska, M., Regulska, J., Mitchneck, B. & Mayorova, O. (2013). Traumatic Masculinities: The Gendered Geographies of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia. *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography*, 20:6, (p.773-793).

lost their status as breadwinners and struggled to accept “changing gender roles and the increased economic responsibilities of women”, which they linked “with their own powerlessness”.

The authors demonstrate that, despite the changes in practices and realities of life, gender norms of Georgian IDPs remained “remarkably constant” - a finding that reflects the work of other scholars on gender dynamics in conflicts. Thus, many IDP men felt that in displacement they could no longer fulfill societal expectations towards them; as one interviewee of the study noted: “Women are providing for men when I look around.” This feeling of powerlessness resulted in the development of ‘traumatic masculinities’ that were “embodied emotionally through depression, apathy, anger, and/or violence”. The tensions arising from the struggle of many IDP men to adapt to the new realities and the emergence of ‘traumatic masculinities’ affected not only men. Counter-intuitively, as Kabachnik et al. demonstrate, these tensions actually resulted in the “reassertion of hegemonic masculinities as expressed in particular instances by increased control of women by men”, and thus, the reassertion of male superiority. As a recent World Bank Study shows, IDP women living in collective centers show higher report rates of sexual harassment and sexual violence than women not living in collective centers.⁵³ While further research is needed to examine the link between traumatic masculinities and gender-based violence in greater detail, this *Spotlight* demonstrates that going beyond *Women, Peace and Security* by working on *gender, peace and security* is key to conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as to the mitigation of the effects of conflicts on individuals.

Despite the efforts towards the implementation of 1325 taken by the Georgian government, Georgia remains a country with major challenges to gender equality - in peace, conflict and beyond. Patriarchal and stereotypical attitudes are widespread in Georgian society. Studies⁵⁴ show that traditional views on gender roles remain strong: Women are mainly perceived as caregivers, while a man’s role is to support the family financially (see the *Spotlight* on “Traumatic Masculinities”). Socially accepted behavior for women is more restricted than for men, while for example infidelity and domestic violence of men are widely accepted: In a 2010 study, 34.1 percent of women stated that a husband is justified in beating his wife in certain cases.⁵⁵ Until now, no standard methodology to keep statistics on violence against women and domestic violence has

⁵³ World Bank (2017). Gender Based Violence in Georgia: Links among Conflict, Economic Opportunities and Services. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29108>

⁵⁴ UNDP Georgia (2013). Research Report: Public Perceptions on Gender Equality in Politics and Business in Georgia. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://www.ge.undp.org/content/dam/georgia/docs/publications/GE_UNDP_Gender_%20Research_ENG.pdf

⁵⁵ Chitashvili, M., Javakhishvili, N., Arutiunov, L., Tsuladze, L., Chachanidze, S. (2010). National Research on Domestic Violence Against Women in Georgia. Final Report. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/GEO/INT_CEDAW_AIS_GEO_13538_E.pdf

been developed. The resulting lack of data prevents a full assessment of the problem as well as a comprehensive provision of services for affected women.

Women's involvement in high-level and decision-making positions remains low: According to the Global Gender Gap Index 2017⁵⁶ Georgia ranks 114th among 144 countries by its score of women's political participation and women in parliament (16 percent of Members of Parliament are women). While women comprise the majority of employees of ministries, their share at managerial positions is only at 19 percent. Women's participation in the armed forces of Georgia stands at 7 percent, while in international peacekeeping missions it is at a mere 1 percent.

Concerning sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), the Office of the Public Defender assesses low awareness for SRHR in general, with the lack of information and deficient access to relevant services as the biggest problems. In this regard, marginalized groups (i.a. IDPs, conflict-affected women, LGBTIQ persons, ethnic minorities) remain most vulnerable. Homophobic, biphobic and transphobic attitudes adversely affect the rights of LGBTIQ people and endanger the idea of equal rights and gender equality.⁵⁷ Anti-gender movements have intensified their activity in Georgia, openly opposing the gender equality policy, ultimately leading to several cases of violations against women and LGBTIQ rights activists.⁵⁸ These challenges demonstrate the need for an intersectional approach to women's rights and Women, Peace and Security, which considers different needs of marginalized groups.

A major problem of the NAPs and other documents on Women, Peace and Security and gender equality is that they do not extend to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which remain outside of the control of the Georgian government. For instance, in a misguided attempt to combat demographic decline, Abkhazia introduced an almost total ban on abortion in 2016; a measure that will endanger the lives of women that will seek illegal abortion. There also appears to be a rise in honor killings.⁵⁹ Freedom House reports that "domestic violence and rape are serious problems, and victims have few avenues for recourse".⁶⁰

⁵⁶ World Economic Forum (2017). Global Gender Gap Index 2017. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf

⁵⁷ Jalagania, L. (2016). Legal Situation of LGBTI Persons in Georgia. Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC). <https://emc.org.ge/uploads/products/pdf/LEGAN-SITUATION-OF-LGBTI-PERSONS-IN-GEORGIA.pdf>

⁵⁸ Public Defender of Georgia (2017). Annual Report. The Situation of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia. (p.97).

⁵⁹ Higgs, J. (2017). In Breakaway Abkhazia, Revived Traditions Put Women on the Edge. Pass Blue, Independent Coverage of the UN. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.passblue.com/2017/06/22/in-breakaway-abkhazia-in-the-caucasus-region-revived-traditions-put-women-on-the-edge/>


⁶⁰ Freedom House (2018). Freedom in the World. Abkhazia Profile. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/abkhazia>

Women, Peace and Security: For More Inclusive Conflict Management in Georgia and Ukraine

The preceding sections presented the Georgian and Ukrainian approaches to the WPS agenda, discussed the respective implementation processes, and gave personal perspectives on certain aspects of gender and conflict. This section compares both cases and summarizes several ideas on how 1325 can provide real opportunities for conflict management and transformation in Georgia and Ukraine.

Spotlight | 1325 at Work? A Comparison of Ukrainian and Georgian Actors

Yuliia Kaplan



There are several influential women’s NGOs in Georgia, including women’s IDP NGOs. Nevertheless, women’s NGOs have limited impact on the only existing platform that brings together representatives of different sides of the Georgian conflicts – the Geneva International Discussions (GID). Neither is there a direct mechanism through which women’s organizations can influence the agenda of the GID nor do they have their own representatives inside the process. However, there is an indirect mechanism through

which women's organizations can influence the Georgian position – regular (quarterly) meetings with the Georgian representatives taking part in the GID, during which women's organizations can present their recommendations. During a meeting, an official from the Ministry of Reconciliation stressed that 9 out of 11 recommendations provided by civil society were included in the Georgian position.

Georgian society continues to discuss various issues related to the August war of 2008, and opinions are often polarized. Issues of conflict resolution and peace are vividly debated, and women's organizations are very vocal here. Nevertheless, debates about the roles of women in the Georgian conflicts and gendered lenses on the consequences of the wars are not in the mainstream. In a recent survey, when asked to name the three most important national issues, 21 percent of respondents mentioned territorial integrity, compared to 51 percent for jobs, 32 percent for poverty, 28 percent for inflation, and another 28 percent for pensions.⁶¹


Women's NGOs in Georgia successfully lobbied for the inclusion of several demands in the third NAP, which can be regarded as a serious achievement. Now, the NAP include provisions on the creation of a conflict early warning system, the creation of a concept on the provision of mental health services for IDP women, and about the necessity of localization of 1325, e.g. the “inclusion of local authorities and other local leaders”⁶² in the implementation process. Currently, a coalition of women's NGOs with support from UN Women and the Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees of the U.S. Department of State provides assistance to conflict affected municipalities in Georgia, with the aim of localizing the NAP and including conflict-affected/displaced women and youth in the process.

Possibilities of Georgian women's NGOs to communicate and cooperate with NGOs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia vary. Exchange between Georgian and certain Abkhazian NGOs is more frequent. NGOs in Abkhazia have many years of experience working with the conflict-affected population and regardless of political and economic difficulties continue to work for women's and youth rights. Abkhazian NGOs have some influence on public opinion and decision makers, although not in the sphere of reconciliation and conflict resolution. Cooperation between the Georgian civil society and South Ossetia takes place on the level of individual civic activists, within only few projects, and has a low impact on South Ossetian society.

⁶¹ Thornton, L., Turmanidze, K. (2018). Public Attitudes in Georgia. Results of June 2018 Public Survey. Carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_June_2018_Presentation_Public_ENG_vf.pdf

⁶² Khanal, P. (2017). Georgia Responds to the Lingering Impact of the War Through Localization of Resolution 1325. The Global Network of Women Peacebuilders. Retrieved December 12, 2018 from <https://gnwp.org/georgia-responds-to-the-lingering-impact-of-the-war-through-localization-of-resolution-1325/>

Ukraine



As the chart illustrates, women's NGOs in Ukraine are in isolation and still do not cooperate with other actors regularly. Taking 1325 seriously, their exclusion from the official peace process, media and expert discourses is a major problem.

Conclusions

Opportunities for cooperation between women's NGOs from government-controlled areas in Ukraine and Georgia with civil society activists and NGOs from uncontrolled territories are limited due to:

- Political constraints, i.e. no or not enough impact on official peace processes in both countries;
- Geographical isolation and a lack of opportunity for physical contacts;
- Lack of access of NGOs to the uncontrolled territories
- Differing visions of NGOs from uncontrolled territories about conflict resolution; differing levels of interest in peace dialogue;
- War propaganda, aimed at the dehumanization of the *Other* (people with opposing views on the conflict);
- Operating at the margins of society, i.e. outside of the mainstream

Thus, Georgian and Ukrainian NGOs should:

- Search for common ground between Georgian and Ukrainian NGOs; unite efforts for better representation in track 1.5 diplomacy;
- Increase their outreach to society in order to enhance public support for and understanding of NGO priorities and policies of reconciliation;
- Conduct joint fundraising campaigns to increase financial support for the priorities of women and girls affected by the conflicts;
- Work more closely with women from the IDP community and conflict-affected regions to bring their voices and needs to decision makers at the local and national level; advocate together for IDP women's and girls' rights in the international arena, using existing instruments of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; make political, societal, social and economic needs, as well as combating violence against women priority areas of their work;
- Continue cooperation with women's NGOs from EU countries, to bring the issues of conflict-affected women and girls onto the international agenda
- Lobby their governments for inclusion into official discussion and negotiation formats

By way of conclusion, we would like to give several concrete examples on how implementing the Agenda can provide real opportunities for conflict management and transformation in Ukraine and Georgia. To begin with, increasing the meaningful **participation** of women in peace and security activities can contribute important and unheard perspectives on priorities on the ground. Meaningful participation, here, refers to a situation in which women are not only present in the room, but “their concerns are heard and taken on board, they have the opportunity to articulate their contributions and expertise”.⁶³ Women remain the primary caregivers in most families, which often makes their daily routines and thus also their concerns different from those of men who have less family responsibilities. At the same time, giving women a seat at the table does not guarantee that “gender equality interests are represented and converted into gender-sensitive provisions in outcome documents and implementation processes”.⁶⁴ Thus, giving a voice to women's rights activists, for instance at the Geneva International Discussions or at the Trilateral Contact Group, could be an important instrument to ensure that gendered perspectives are taken into account. A further issue that came up during our discussions is the need for women to engage in networking and to enhance their linkages in order to break the cycle of marginalization in political participation and decision-making.

⁶³ UN Women (2018). Women's Meaningful Participation in Negotiating Peace and and the Implementation of Peace Agreements. Report of the Expert Group Meeting. (p.11). Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2018/egm-womens-meaningful-participation-in-negotiating-peace-en.pdf?la=en&vs=3047>

⁶⁴ Ibid.

With regard to **conflict prevention**, we found that women in Georgia and Ukraine often work as “communication corridors” between conflict groups - which relates to the above-mentioned fact that women are still the primary caregivers, sometimes even across conflict lines. Moreover, the fact that women are less engaged in military activities can make them more trustworthy to the opposing side. We also argue that challenging gender stereotypes, including stereotypes which lead to militarized or toxic masculinities, in the long term provides real chances for peace - within and across societies. We take note of an increasing awareness for understanding gender as more than just “women” - even the recent conclusions of the Council of the European Union on Women, Peace and Security, adopted on 10 December 2018, state that the EU will engage in the promotion of “gender-equitable and non-violent masculinity, an essential step towards fostering peaceful and inclusive societies”.⁶⁵

With regard to **protection**, our workshops and research revealed that good gender-aggregated data is key to ensuring women’s protection - be it from domestic violence or from diseases that affect displaced women differently. Moreover, it is important that cities, villages and collective centers are build in ways that make women feel secure, which can relate to such simple things as installing lights. In order to ensure better protection, services for survivors of domestic violence, such as shelters or crisis centers, have to be easily accessible in all parts of the country. Finally, in **relief and recovery** measures, policy planners should ensure that women’s voices are heard and the services they provide are actually targeted towards the needs of conflict-affected women. Taking these measures will not transform the Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts over night. It will, however, certainly improve the living conditions of many conflict-affected persons of all genders, which is why more attention is needed for the comprehensive implementation of 1325 in both countries.

From 1325 Towards A Feminist Foreign Policy

While a comprehensive rethinking of 1325 is beyond the scope of this report, it should be mentioned that the Agenda also has its critics. For many years, feminist scholars and activists have argued that the Agenda 1325 does not go far enough. For instance, they have criticized it for understanding “gender” as referring solely to “women” and thus considering the perspectives of men the “norm”. Studies have demonstrated that a disregard for gender-specific issues of men leads to the ignoring or aggravation of problems that an inclusive perspective on gender & conflict could actually tackle (see the *Spotlight* on “Traumatic Masculinities”). The agenda also suffers from a lack of awareness for intersectionality, i.e. the understanding that women are not a

⁶⁵ Council of the European Union (2018). Women, Peace and Security - Council Conclusions, 10 December 2018. p.19. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37412/st15086-en18.pdf>

homogenous group and are affected by multiple forms of discrimination at the same time. Gender-based discrimination can intersect with discrimination based on ethnic or sexual identity, disability or age. Moreover, it has been argued that the Agenda 1325 tackles effects more than root causes. With the words of Barnes, UNSCR 1325 “fails to challenge some of the more entrenched, fundamental constructs linked to notions of masculinity, military/ized power and gender inequalities that are tied up in the discourse of international peace and security institutions”.⁶⁶

Finally, it should be noted that the Agenda 1325 could serve as the backbone of a feminist foreign policy. Pursuing a feminist foreign policy means that each and every foreign policy action is analyzed with regard to its effect on different genders, and that negative effects on women (and any other gender) should be avoided. For instance, a feminist approach to international trade agreements means including clauses on human rights protection in supply chains of the garment industry, as it is mostly women working in garment factories, often in life-threatening conditions⁶⁷. A feminist foreign policy takes action against the negative consequences of climate change that affect women, men and children in different ways.⁶⁸ It has a strong gender lens in global health projects, meaning that it aims at combating the causes and consequences of diseases and health issues like addiction that affect women and men differently. A feminist foreign policy strongly supports the empowerment of women around the world. But it also works on empowering men – on liberating them from toxic masculinity, i.e. harmful norms that contribute to various forms of risk taking behavior and violence, including violence against women. Women, Peace and Security, particularly if conceived as *gender, peace and security*, can be an important first step on that road. Future initiatives, no matter if on the UN, national, civil society, or any other level, should thus take broader perspectives of *gender, peace and security* and feminist foreign policy into account.

⁶⁶ Barnes, K. (2011). The Evolution and Implementation of UNSCR 1325. (p.20).

⁶⁷ Musaddique, S. (2018). Bangladesh Factories Still Pose ‘Life-Threatening’ Risks Five Years on from Rana Plaza Disaster. Retrieved December 14, 2018, from <https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/24/bangladesh-factories-still-pose-life-threatening-risks-five-years-on-from-rana-plaza-disaster.html>

⁶⁸ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2018). Introduction to Gender and Climate Change. Retrieved December 14, 2018 from <https://unfccc.int/topics/gender/the-big-picture/introduction-to-gender-and-climate-change>

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